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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The endorsement test, first explained by Justice O’Connor in her Lynch 
v. Donnelly1 concurrence and adopted by the Court in County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,2 provides one way to determine whether 
state action violates Establishment Clause guarantees.  Now that Justice 
O’Connor has retired, there is some question whether the endorsement test 
will survive.  Despite commentators’ claims to the contrary, however, there 
is no reason to think that the endorsement test retired along with Justice 
O’Connor, although a separate issue is whether those on the Court using the 
test will do more than give occasional lip service to the interests and 
 *  Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.  This Article is 
a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing 
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? 
 1.  465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984). 
 2.  492 U.S. 573, 574 (1989). 
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perspectives of minority religious groups.3  At this point, the most likely 
scenario is that the Court will sometimes use the test,4 but will be unlikely to 
use it to strike down a particular practice. 
Part II of this Article discusses the development of the endorsement test 
during the period that Justice O’Connor was on the Court, noting some of 
the ambiguities in the test’s formulation and application.  Part III of this 
Article discusses how the test has been used in two cases since Justice 
O’Connor’s retirement, noting that the way that the test has been used after 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement mirrors the way that it was used while she 
was still on the Court.  The Article concludes that the test is likely to remain 
one of the tests used by the Court to determine whether Establishment 
Clause guarantees have been violated—the test will retain its potential to 
assure that individuals will not be treated as second-class citizens because of 
their religious beliefs but will in reality pay mere lip service to religious 
minorities’ sincere reactions to a variety of practices privileging some 
religions over others and privileging religion over non-religion. 
II.  THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST 
The endorsement test has been evolving since its inception in the 1980s.  
At first, the test seemed to have great promise, because it was designed to 
prevent the government from acting in ways that would make religious 
minorities feel like second-class citizens.5  While the test as applied did not 
always fulfill its potential, it at least seemed much more protective than 
other possible tests.6  Regrettably, the test is sometimes used in ways that not 
only fail to protect religious minorities, but also implicitly cast aspersions 
upon some of the very people whom it is designed to protect.7 
 3.  See Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting 
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 140 (“With the departure of Justice O’Connor—the author and 
most committed supporter of the endorsement notion—there is a good chance that the test will retire 
along with her.  In fact, because the test is so keyed to judicial perception, a change in personnel 
almost necessarily changes the rule.”). 
 4.  Even after the text had been adopted and Justice O’Connor was still on the Court, the test 
was only sometimes used.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down 
graduation benediction as violation of Establishment Clause guarantees against coercion). 
 5.  Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious Minorities: On the Evolution of 
the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 668. 
 6.  See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” practices or overt efforts 
at government proselytization, . . . but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle 
ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of 
disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious liberty or 
respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political community. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 7.  Strasser, supra note 5, at 668. 
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A.  Lynch and the Birth of the Endorsement Test 
The endorsement test first appeared in a concurrence written by Justice 
O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.8  The Lynch Court upheld a holiday display 
in a public park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and Justice O’Connor claimed 
that her endorsement test was both compatible with the Court’s decision and 
with the prevailing Establishment Clause jurisprudence.9 
The Christmas display at issue included, among other things, reindeer 
pulling Santa’s sleigh, a Christmas tree, an elephant, a teddy bear, candy-
striped poles, and a crèche.10  The constitutional challenge was to the 
inclusion of the crèche in particular.11 
To assess whether that inclusion involved an impermissible promotion 
of religion, the Lynch Court examined some of the previous practices that 
had passed constitutional muster.12  Concluding that the crèche’s inclusion 
did not promote religion any more than did the practices whose 
constitutionality had already been upheld, the Court held that the practice at 
issue did not violate constitutional guarantees.13 
Regrettably, there was something at the very least disingenuous about 
the Lynch Court’s analysis.  The constitutionally permissible practices that 
the Lynch Court described as promoting religion had been described much 
differently when the constitutionality of those very practices had been at 
issue—indeed, the Court had suggested in many of the cases that the failure 
to uphold the practice at issue would indicate a lack of neutrality towards 
religion,14 which might be thought to indicate either “hostility toward 
 8.  465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984). 
 9.  In his Lynch dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that the majority decision was incompatible 
with the existing jurisprudence.  Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Despite the narrow contours of 
the Court’s opinion, our precedents in my view compel the holding that Pawtucket’s inclusion of a 
life-sized display depicting the biblical description of the birth of Christ as part of its annual 
Christmas celebration is unconstitutional.”). 
 10.  Id. at 671 (plurality opinion). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 675–79. 
 13.  Id. at 681–82. 
 14.  See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976) (reasoning that “religious 
institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all”); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (“The law merely makes available to all children the 
benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (suggesting that the legislation at issue does “no more than provide a general 
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to 
and from accredited schools”). 
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religion”15 or a “callous indifference” towards religion.16  At the very least, 
the malleability of the implicit standard used by the Lynch Court is a cause 
for concern.  If the same standard could yield the conclusion that the failure 
to permit certain practices would hinder or undermine religion and that 
permitting those very practices would promote religion, then the standard is 
either useless or, perhaps, simply providing cover for a conclusion reached 
in light of a different method or standard of analysis. 
In her Lynch concurrence, Justice O’Connor proposed and explicated 
the endorsement test as a method for determining whether Establishment 
Clause guarantees had been violated.17  She explained that the Lemon test, 
sometimes used at the time to determine whether Establishment Clause 
guarantees had been violated,18 should be understood to specify two different 
ways in which the state might violate the relevant guarantees: (1) “excessive 
entanglement with religious institutions,”19 and (2) “government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”20  The latter, she explained, should 
be understood in terms of the endorsement test. 
The endorsement test precludes the government from sending a 
“message to [religious] nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”21  The government is also prohibited from sending the opposite 
message, such as its disapproval of religion.22 
The endorsement test focuses on two distinct messages, which may but 
need not coincide.  One involves what the state was trying to communicate 
by performing the challenged action, and the other involves the message 
 15.  Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). 
 16.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.  Sometimes, members of the Court accuse each other of being either 
hostile or callous toward religion.  See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989) (“Justice Kennedy repeatedly accuses the Court of harboring a 
‘latent hostility’ or ‘callous indifference’ toward religion . . . .”). 
 17.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 18.  For example, the Lemon test was not used in Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Court upheld 
the practice of legislative prayer.  Marsh v. Chambers,  463 U.S. 783, 800–01 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of 
Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be 
unconstitutional.”).  The test was used in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), to uphold 
Minnesota’s granting a tax deduction for expenses incurred in sending children to elementary and 
secondary schools, and was used in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), to strike down an 
Alabama law setting aside a period of silence (not to exceed a minute) at the beginning of the first 
class of the day for meditation or voluntary prayer. 
 19.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 20.  Id. at 688. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See id. 
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actually communicated.23  If either the intended or the actual message 
involves the endorsement or disapproval of religion, then the challenged 
action fails the test and is unconstitutional.24 
Consider how one would go about determining what a state was trying 
to communicate when performing a particular action.  One might examine 
the express comments of those approving a particular policy.25  However, if 
that were the relevant test, it would be unsurprising for many legislators to 
be rather circumspect in what they would say on the record if only so that 
their legislative action would be more likely to survive a constitutional 
challenge.26  Indeed, one might expect legislators to expressly deny that they 
were attempting to endorse certain religious views over others in an attempt 
to forestall a charge of favoritism,27 although a separate issue would be 
whether a court would accept the legislators’ comments at face value.28 
Suppose that some legislators make clear that they support particular 
legislation because they want to promote particular religious views.29  That 
hardly establishes that others supporting the measure also want to promote 
 23.  See id. at 690. 
 24.  See id. (“An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice 
invalid.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
The Court stated: 
Councilman Martinez, after noting his belief that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba, 
questioned: “[I]f we could not practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring 
it to this country?”  Councilman Cardoso said that Santeria devotees at the Church “are in 
violation of everything this country stands for.”  Councilman Mejides indicated that he 
was “totally against the sacrificing of animals” and distinguished kosher slaughter 
because it had a “real purpose.”  The “Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice an animal 
for consumption,” he continued, “but for any other purposes, I don’t believe that the 
Bible allows that.”  The president of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: 
“What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?” 
Id. at 541. 
 26.  See Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court’s Affirmative 
Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 340 (1994) (“The Court could demand direct 
evidence of illicit motivation before finding animus.  This predicate would be very difficult to 
establish because individuals or legislators who wished to invidiously discriminate would be 
unlikely to reveal their actual motivations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 27.  See 154 CONG. REC. E2174 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2008) (Rep. Corrine Brown stated: “It is not 
my intention by this statement to endorse one religion or religious leader over another.”). 
 28.  See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (“But the mere recitation of a 
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the 
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.”). 
 29.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 41 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“It is true that some of the legislators who voted to add the phrase ‘under God’ to 
the Pledge may have done so in an attempt to attach to it an overtly religious message.”). 
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those same religious views,30 especially when the Constitution precludes 
legislatures from trying to do so.31  Merely because particular individuals 
wish to promote certain religious views would not itself justify imputing a 
similar goal to the state.  That said, however, there will be some 
circumstances under which the state will be found to have a forbidden 
purpose.  For example, in Wallace v. Jaffree,32 the Court examined an 
Alabama statute authorizing a minute of silence to begin the school day “for 
meditation or voluntary prayer.”33  Because a minute of silence for 
meditation was already authorized,34 the Court could discern no secular 
purpose in specifying that the minute set aside could be used for voluntary 
prayer as well.35 
If a state will be found to intend to promote religion only in cases in 
which there is no secular purpose for its action, then there will be very few 
instances in which the state will be found to have an impermissible goal.36  
In most cases, there will be some secular purpose that can be asserted.37  
Justice O’Connor expressly rejected that the mere existence of a secular 
purpose would immunize the state from the charge that it was attempting to 
promote religion.38  For example, she noted that the Court had struck down 
posting copies of the Ten Commandments in the public schools,39 even when 
the state had some secular purposes behind doing so, for example, “instilling 
most of the values of the Ten Commandments and illustrating their 
connection to our legal system.”40  Thus, the relevant question is not whether 
 30.  See id. at 25–26 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The amendment’s sponsor, 
Representative Rabaut, said its purpose was to contrast this country’s belief in God with the Soviet 
Union’s embrace of atheism.  100 Cong. Rec. 1700 (1954).  We do not know what other Members of 
Congress thought about the purpose of the amendment.”); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Rarely can it be said that a legislature or 
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single 
concern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”). 
 31.  See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) (“[W]e do not impute 
to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed by this 
Court.”). 
 32.  472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 33.  Id. at 40. 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  Id. at 56. 
 36.  Cf. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901–02 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the relevant test is whether the state has any secular purpose at all). 
 37.  See id. at 865 n.13 (discussing “the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost any 
government action”). 
 38.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668, 690–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“That 
requirement is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however 
dominated by religious purposes.”). 
 39.  See id. at 691 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). 
 40.  See id. 
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there was any secular purpose at all but, instead, whether the religious 
purposes “dominated.”41 
After explaining some of the factors to be considered as a general matter 
when seeking to uncover the state’s purposes, Justice O’Connor set about 
analyzing what the state intended to convey by including a crèche within the 
challenged display.  The district court had found that the state had intended 
to promote religion by including the crèche,42 but Justice O’Connor 
disagreed: “When viewed in light of correct legal principles, the District 
Court’s finding of unlawful purpose was clearly erroneous.”43 
What had been the district court’s error?  Justice O’Connor criticized the 
district court for its willingness to “ascertain the city’s purpose in displaying 
the crèche separate and apart from the general purpose in setting up the 
display.”44  Of course, the district court had focused on the crèche because 
the challenge had been to its inclusion in particular.  Each year, the display 
had been assembled anew.  The plaintiff was not seeking to enjoin the city 
from having a holiday display at all but, instead, was seeking to prevent the 
city from including a particular element within that display. 
Justice O’Connor did not explain why a specific part of the display 
could not be challenged, although some justifications come to mind.  
Perhaps she feared that permitting such a challenge would invite challenges 
to particular aspects of sculptures or paintings, although those artistic 
displays might be distinguishable in that the removal of the challenged part 
might be much more difficult.  For example, removing a part of a statute 
would literally destroy the work.45  Of course, there would be other ways to 
prevent a statue from conveying a particular message; for example, one 
might try to cover up a part of a display that was deemed offensive.46  
However, covering up part of the work might itself be thought to convey a 
message; for example, that there was something about that part of the work 
in particular that should not be seen.  Such a method of altering a message 
might be contrasted with changing the composition of a display by including 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  One might have a monument that included both religious and non-religious elements.  See 
Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 801 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing monument 
which included the Mayflower Compact in addition to the Ten Commandments). 
 46.  See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The Bull by the Horns: Nadine Strossen, Pornography, and 
Free Speech, 41 TULSA L. REV. 677, 680 (2006) (discussing “Attorney General John Ashcroft 
hanging drapes over the full-figured, but unfortunately bare-breasted Statue of Justice in, of all 
places, the Justice Department”). 
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different elements in a particular year.47  There would be nothing contained 
in the display itself that would suggest that there had been any controversy 
about the elements included within it. 
True, someone might well remember that other elements had been 
included in previous years, so it should not be thought that the failure to 
include something in a display would simply go unnoticed.  That said, 
however, the failure to include a crèche might well be taken in a different 
way than would, for example, covering up a crèche that was part of a 
display. 
One of the issues at trial was whether the city would have a display at all 
if the crèche were not included.  The mayor had testified that the display 
would be erected without the crèche, if necessary,48 although he also testified 
that people would be upset if the crèche were not included.49  Yet, an 
important element of the analysis involves why those people would be upset.  
There was testimony that the display would serve its commercial purpose of 
drawing people downtown even if the crèche were not included,50 and that 
inclusion of the crèche added a religious dimension to the display.51  Thus, 
the secular purposes for its inclusion were undermined at trial, and there was 
strong evidence that its inclusion was motivated by a desire to promote the 
religious aspects of Christmas.  But if the public outrage at the crèche’s 
exclusion was to the state refusal to endorse the majority’s religious beliefs, 
then the negative reaction would be to the state refusal to violate the 
Constitution. 
Justice O’Connor also criticized the district court for finding that the 
city’s “use of an unarguably religious symbol ‘raises an inference’ of intent 
to endorse.”52  Yet, the district court had not simply said that by using the 
crèche the city should be inferred to have intended to endorse a particular 
religion.  On the contrary, the court referred to a variety of factors that 
supported its conclusion.  For example, the mayor had implied that not 
 47.  The design might change from year to year.  See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 
1155 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (“Subject to the 
final approval of the Director of Parks and Recreation, a City maintenance supervisor designs the 
layout of the display.  The Mayor may make changes in the layout.”); see also id. at 1155 n.6  (“The 
Mayor testified that he had in fact made changes in the display in the past.”). 
 48.  See id. at 1158. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See id. at 1159 (discussing testimony that “the nativity scene added ‘absolutely nothing’ to 
the impact of the display for commercial purposes”). 
 51.  See id. at 1171 (“The City effectively concedes that the role of the creche in the Hodgson 
Park display is to evoke the religious aspect of Christmas.”); see also id. at 1161 (“The most 
recurrent comments appearing in over half the letters are that the birth of Christ is the essence of 
Christmas, and that the presence of the creche, as a symbol of this spiritual core, is necessary to 
preserve the true meaning of the holiday.”). 
 52.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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including the crèche in the Christmas display would “take Christ out of 
Christmas.”53  Apparently, many in the community supported including the 
crèche in the display because they believed that the city “had a right to 
sponsor and support the religious views of the majority.”54  The court further 
noted that the city had not taken any steps to minimize or disclaim any 
perceived endorsement of religion resulting from inclusion of the crèche.55  
The district court’s understated conclusion that one might reasonably infer 
an intent to endorse was transformed by Justice O’Connor into an 
unwarranted assumption allegedly based on the mere fact of the crèche’s 
inclusion.56 
The errors mentioned by Justice O’Connor suggest that a court making 
use of the endorsement test should not examine whether a particular part of a 
display should have been included, but instead should examine the overall 
effect of a particular display.  If a display includes a crèche, then one might 
examine factors such as how big the crèche is57 and where it is placed58 to 
determine whether the overall effect of the display is to endorse religion.  
Rather than engage in that kind of analysis to determine whether the display 
as a whole was intended to endorse religion or, perhaps, would have the 
effect of endorsing religion, Justice O’Connor suggested that the “evident 
purpose of including the crèche in the larger display was not promotion of 
the religious content of the crèche but celebration of the public holiday 
through its traditional symbols.”59  Of course, that conclusion was not 
evident to the trier of fact, and Justice O’Connor did not point to anything in 
the record that would have made the trial court’s contrary conclusion 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
Justice O’Connor explained: “Celebration of public holidays, which 
have cultural significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a 
legitimate secular purpose.”60  But, even if the celebration of a public 
 53.  See Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1159. 
 54.  Id. at 1158. 
 55.  See id. at 1172. 
 56.  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 57.  Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1176 (“[V]iewers would not regard the creche as an insignificant 
part of the display.  It is an almost life sized tableau marked off by a white picket fence.”). 
 58.  Id. at 1176–77 (“[T]he creche is near two of the most enticing parts of the display for 
children—Santa’s house and the talking wishing well.  Although the Court recognizes that one 
cannot see the creche from all possible vantage points, it is clear from the City’s own photos that 
people standing at the two bus shelters and looking down at the display will see the creche centrally 
and prominently positioned.”). 
 59.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 60.  Id. 
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holiday can serve a legitimate purpose, that hardly means that all 
celebrations of public holidays are immunized from constitutional review. 
Presumably, the mayor officially participating in the celebration of a 
Christmas Mass would not pass muster, even though that might be described 
as celebrating a public holiday.61 
When discussing the endorsement test, Justice O’Connor made clear 
that it was crucial that “a government practice not have the effect of 
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.”62  She emphasized the importance of not making “religion 
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political 
community.”63  But holding as a matter of law that inclusion of a crèche in a 
holiday display could not make religion relevant in the prohibited way 
undercut the very test that was being proposed. 
Ironically, there had been testimony at trial that the inclusion of the 
crèche was viewed with fear,64 because the city’s inclusion of that religious 
symbol exemplified “an increasing tendency of various religious groups to 
become more political and thereby to impose their views on the larger 
society.”65  Others likely grew fearful after witnessing the “intensity of 
feelings”66 in response to the suit to remove the crèche from the display.  
Apparently, many of those expressing outrage believed the lawsuit 
represented “an attack on the presence of religion as part of the community’s 
life, an attempt to deny the majority the ability to express publically its 
beliefs in a desired and traditionally accepted way.”67 
For the court to assess whether the city had intended to promote religion 
by including the crèche within the display, it might have needed to examine 
the city’s purposes when that display had first been erected forty years 
earlier.68  Even if the original purpose had been to promote religion, 
however, a separate issue would be whether that was the reason for 
continuing the tradition.69  Most of the district court’s focus was on why the 
 61.  See id. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, in its eagerness to approve the crèche, the 
Court has advanced a rationale so simplistic that it would appear to allow the Mayor of Pawtucket to 
participate in the celebration of a Christmas Mass, since this would be just another unobjectionable 
way for the City to ‘celebrate the holiday.’”). 
 62.  Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 
1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 1162. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See id. at 1158 (noting that the display was an “accepted community tradition for 40 years”). 
 69.  See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961) (recognizing the “strongly 
religious origin” of Sunday closing laws).  The Court also noted, however, that there were current 
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city was continuing to mount the display with the crèche included, and the 
court held that the city’s continuing to include the crèche had the effect of 
promoting religion in violation of Establishment Clause guarantees.70 
Justice O’Connor’s willingness to uphold the inclusion of the crèche as 
a matter of law is problematic, because such a position is utterly divorced 
from actual perceptions.  She would have found both that the state could not 
intend to endorse religion by including a crèche in a holiday display and that 
such a display could not reasonably be thought an endorsement, despite the 
findings to the contrary by the trier of fact.71  Her endorsement test would 
uphold the inclusion of the crèche in a winter display, even if most of the 
members of the community understood the inclusion of the crèche as an 
endorsement of a particular religious view.  This was not an auspicious 
beginning for a test that was claimed to be intrinsically tied to public 
perceptions.72 
B.  The Court Adopts the Endorsement Test 
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,73 the 
Court employed the endorsement test to strike down the placement of a 
crèche on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.74  
Justice O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence was praised as “provid[ing] a sound 
analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious 
symbols.”75  The test would determine “whether the government’s use of an 
object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion.”76  That 
effect would be judged in light of the “message that the government’s 
practice communicates: the question is ‘what viewers may fairly understand 
to be the purpose of the display.’”77 
secular justifications for such laws.  See id. at 444 (“[A]s presently written and administered, most of 
[the Sunday Closing laws], at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious character.”). 
 70.  Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1181 (“This Court finds that by including a nativity scene in its 
Christmas display, the City of Pawtucket has violated the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution.”). 
 71.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 72.  Id. at 692. 
 73.  492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 74.  See id. at 621 (noting “the longstanding constitutional principle that government may not 
engage in a practice that has the effect of promoting or endorsing religious beliefs” and concluding 
that the “display of the crèche in the county courthouse has this unconstitutional effect”). 
 75.  Id. at 595. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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Claiming to apply the endorsement test, the Court explained that no one 
could reasonably think that the crèche “occupies this location without the 
support and approval of the government.”78  However, pains were taken to 
distinguish the constitutionally impermissible crèche at issue in Allegheny 
from the constitutionally permissible crèche at issue in Lynch.  The latter did 
not involve government endorsement. 
[B]ecause the crèche is “a traditional symbol” of Christmas, a 
holiday with strong secular elements, and because the crèche was 
“displayed along with purely secular symbols,” the crèche’s setting 
“changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of 
the display” and “negates any message of endorsement” of “the 
Christian beliefs represented by the crèche.”79 
Yet, it may be instructive to consider some of the other secular symbols 
included within the Lynch display: “a Santa Claus house with a live Santa 
distributing candy; reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh; a live 40–foot Christmas 
tree strung with lights; [and] statues of carolers in old-fashioned dress.”80  
Apparently, these purely secular symbols helped to negate any message of 
endorsement that might otherwise have been perceived. 
At least one question that should have been addressed is whether a 
nonadherent would describe all of these symbols as “purely secular.”81  
Consider, for example, the “widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as 
the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas holiday.”82  The implication 
is that one would be unreasonable to view the Christmas tree as endorsing a 
religious view, even though “Christmas trees once carried religious 
connotations.”83  Yet, for some non-Christians, the Christmas tree continues 
to carry religious connotations.84 
Certainly, it is fair to suggest that merely because something was once a 
religious symbol does not guarantee that it will always remain one.  But that 
observation merely begins the inquiry, because it will then be important to 
determine whether the symbol at issue itself has ceased to have a religious 
dimension.  For example, Justice O’Connor noted that Thanksgiving is now 
 78.  Id. at 599–600. 
 79.  Id. at 596 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 617. 
 83.  Id. at 616. 
 84.  See Joel S. Jacobs, Endorsement as “Adoptive Action:” A Suggested Definition of, and an 
Argument for, Justice O’Connor’s Establishment Clause Test, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 46 
(1994) (“While Christmas trees may seem innocuous to those who display them, they retain 
Christian symbolism.  Christmas trees, as the name suggests, have long had a strong association with 
Christianity.”). 
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understood as a celebration of patriotic values rather than religious beliefs,85 
although it is an empirical question whether atheists, for example, view the 
holiday as completely divorced from religious belief.86  She also agreed with 
Justice Blackmun that Christmas trees are secular rather than religious, 
although she rejected his assertion87 that a menorah has a secular element.88  
Justice Brennan rejected in his concurring and dissenting opinion that the 
Christmas tree was necessarily secular, suggesting that it may not be “so 
seen when combined with other symbols or objects.”89  But the lack of 
consensus within the Court itself with respect to which symbols are secular 
and which are not suggests that this is a topic about which reasonable 
observers might disagree. 
Suppose that there was a display with a crèche, a Christmas tree, a Santa 
Claus, and a sleigh pulled by reindeer.  Some would say that the secular tree, 
sleigh and reindeer, and Santa Claus would secularize the crèche.90 
However, other observers might reasonably view such a display as 
promoting both the religious and non-religious aspects of Christmas.  
Certainly, it would be unsurprising for individuals who did not celebrate 
Christmas to feel like “outsiders [who were] less than full members of the 
political community”91 when they saw the city put on such a display.92  As 
Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring and dissenting opinion, an atheist 
would reasonably feel like an outsider when the state engages in a number of 
differing practices, for example, when an individual recites the Pledge of 
 85.  See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 86.  See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (suggesting that atheists might have 
objections to Thanksgiving because it seems to promote religion). 
 87.  See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 617 (discussing “the secular component of the message 
communicated by other elements of an accompanying holiday display, including the Chanukah 
menorah”). 
 88.  See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing 
“the religious nature of the menorah and the holiday of Chanukah”). 
 89.  Id. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 90.  See id. at 596 (plurality opinion) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 91.  Id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 92.  See id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Brennan 
stated: 
I do not know how we can decide whether it was the tree that stripped the religious 
connotations from the menorah, or the menorah that laid bare the religious origins of the 
tree.  Both are reasonable interpretations of the scene the city presented, and thus both, I 
think, should satisfy Justice Blackmun’s requirement that the display “be judged 
according to the standard of a ‘reasonable observer.’” 
Id. 
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Allegiance which, under law, “describes the United States as ‘one Nation 
under God.’”93 
One of the salient differences among members of the Court involves 
their assessments of how a reasonable observer would react to a particular 
display.  Several views were offered, including that no reasonable observer 
would find a Christmas tree to be religious;94 a reasonable observer might 
find a Christmas tree to be religious when paired with a menorah;95 a 
reasonable person would find a Christmas tree to be religious when paired 
with a menorah;96 no reasonable observer would infer religious endorsement 
where a religious symbol like a menorah was displayed along with a secular 
symbol like a Christmas tree;97 a reasonable observer would find such a 
display an endorsement;98 and some reasonable observers would find such a 
display to be an endorsement but other reasonable observers would not.99 
With such a range of views about what a reasonable observer would or 
might say, one might have expected the Court to offer a more complete 
analysis of how the endorsement test works.  For example, the Court might 
have explained whether (1) a state practice violates constitutional guarantees 
under the endorsement test as long as a reasonable observer believes that it 
promotes or undermines religion, or (2) a state practice passes muster under 
the endorsement test as long as a reasonable observer believes that the 
practice does not promote or undermine religion.  Assuming that the Justices 
on the Supreme Court qualify as reasonable observers and that reasonable 
observers might disagree about whether a particular practice promotes or 
undermines religion, the very practices at issue in Lynch and Allegheny 
would fail or pass the test respectively, depending upon which type of 
reasoning accurately captures the test. 
 93.  See id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 94.  Id. at 616 (plurality opinion) (“The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a 
religious symbol.”). 
 95.  See id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 96.  See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 97.  Id. at 617–18 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he combination of the tree and the menorah 
communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead, 
a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a 
contemporaneous alternative tradition.”). 
 98.  See id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he presence of the 
Chanukah menorah, unquestionably a religious symbol, gives religious significance to the Christmas 
tree.”). 
 99.  See id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that 
different interpretations would be reasonable). 
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C.  When Would a Reasonable Observer Infer Endorsement? 
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,100 Justice 
O’Connor suggested that one reason that the Justices do not agree about 
what a reasonable person would say when viewing a particular display is 
that the Justices impute differing levels of knowledge to the reasonable 
person.101  At issue in Pinette was whether the denial of a permit to the Ku 
Klux Klan to display a Latin cross in Capitol Square in front of the 
statehouse offended constitutional guarantees.102  The state of Ohio had 
feared that the unattended cross would be inferred to involve official 
endorsement of Christianity by the state.103 
The Pinette plurality refused to find that the state would be justified in 
restricting private expression merely “because an observer might mistake 
private expression for officially endorsed religious expression.”104  Instead, 
the plurality stated: “Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment 
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or 
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal 
terms.”105  While making clear that the display at issue passed constitutional 
muster under the endorsement test, the plurality was not especially clear 
about why that was so. 
One interpretation of the plurality’s position is that the endorsement test 
simply should not be applied if private speech is at issue,106 assuming that 
the state has had no hand in encouraging the misunderstanding that the 
expression is public speech.107  According to this interpretation, even private 
religious speech reasonably perceived as involving a government 
endorsement does not fail the endorsement test as long as the state was not 
 100.  515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 101.  See id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my 
view, proper application of the endorsement test requires that the reasonable observer be deemed 
more informed than the casual passerby postulated by Justice Stevens.”). 
 102.  Id. at 757 (plurality opinion) (“Capitol Square is a 10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding 
the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio.”). 
 103.  Id. at 761. 
 104.  Id. at 763. 
 105.  Id. at 770. 
 106.  See id. at 763 (“We must note, to begin with, that it is not really an ‘endorsement test’ of any 
sort, much less the ‘endorsement test’ which appears in our more recent Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, that petitioners urge upon us.”); see also id. at 764 (“The test petitioners propose, 
which would attribute to a neutrally behaving government private religious expression, has no 
antecedent in our jurisprudence, and would better be called a ‘transferred endorsement’ test.”). 
 107.  See id. at 766 (reasoning that mistaken attribution to the government will not fail the 
endorsement test where  “government has not fostered or encouraged the mistake”). 
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complicit in promoting the misattribution,108 because the endorsement test is 
not designed to cover this kind of case.109 
A different interpretation of the plurality position is that the 
endorsement test is the correct test to use in this kind of case, but as a matter 
of law that test cannot be used to invalidate private speech unless the 
government somehow promotes the misperception that the speech is 
governmental.110  The first interpretation limits the circumstances under 
which the endorsement test is applicable, which means that some other test 
must be used to determine whether the display at issue violates constitutional 
guarantees.  In contrast, the second interpretation suggests that the 
endorsement test is the appropriate standard by which to determine whether 
the display violates constitutional guarantees and further suggests as a matter 
of law that the display is permissible because a reasonable person could not 
infer endorsement under such circumstances. 
Justice O’Connor agreed with the Pinette plurality that, in the particular 
case at hand, a “reasonable, informed observer”111 would not impute the 
message to the state,112 although she rejected that such an observer could 
never misperceive private speech as state endorsement.  For example, Justice 
O’Connor suggested that in some cases “the presence of a sign disclaiming 
government sponsorship or endorsement”113 might be required because the 
Establishment Clause “imposes affirmative obligations that may require a 
State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as 
supporting or endorsing a private religious message.”114 
Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that the state might be required to post a 
disclaimer casts some light on her requirement that the observer be 
informed.  If the observer were fully informed, she would not need to be told 
by the state that the speech at issue was private rather than public.  Thus, 
Justice O’Connor suggests that a reasonable person need not be fully 
informed; else, the (sometimes required) disclaimer would only serve to 
 108.  See id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The 
plurality’s opinion declines to apply the endorsement test to the Board’s action, in favor of a per se 
rule: religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is private and (2) 
occurs in a public forum, even if a reasonable observer would see the expression as indicating state 
endorsement.”). 
 109.  Id. at 764 (plurality opinion) (“Where we have tested for endorsement of religion, the 
subject of the test was either expression by the government itself, . . . or else government action 
alleged to discriminate in favor of private religious expression or activity . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 110.  But see id. at 774 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I 
believe that an impermissible message of endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of 
which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism.”). 
 111.  See id. at 773. 
 112.  See id. at 772. 
 113.  Id. at 776. 
 114.  Id. at 777. 
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inform the observer of something she already knows.  That said, however, 
members of the Court have had some difficulty in specifying just what or 
how much the reasonable observer should know before making a judgment 
about whether something promotes or undermines religion. 
Consider Justice O’Connor’s comment that “[t]here is always someone 
who, with a particular quantum of knowledge, reasonably might perceive a 
particular action as an endorsement of religion.”115  Her point is well-taken 
that the endorsement test cannot be based on whether there exists one 
sincere person who, in light of her own level of knowledge, believes that a 
particular practice promotes or undermines religion.  Yet, it is difficult to tell 
whether the emphasis should be on the possibly deficient level of knowledge 
or, perhaps, on the fact that only one individual has had the relevant 
reaction.  For example, suppose that there were several people who, with a 
particular quantum of knowledge, believed that a particular action promoted 
religion.  Would that reaction now be given weight because it was shared by 
several people, or would it not be given weight because those having it only 
had a particular quantum of knowledge? 
An analogous point might be made with respect to the observation that a 
state has not “made religion relevant to standing in the political community 
simply because a particular viewer of a display might feel uncomfortable.”116  
Even assuming that the discomfort is associated with an individual’s 
inference that the state is supporting or undermining religion, one cannot tell 
whether such discomfort would make religion relevant to standing if shared 
by several people or, instead, whether something more must be shown to 
establish that standing in the political community had been affected. 
Regrettably, Justice O’Connor’s focus is neither on the number of 
individuals who might have had a particular idiosyncratic reaction to a 
display nor even on whether such individuals misperceived endorsement 
because of a lack of awareness of a crucial fact.  Justice O’Connor explains 
that “the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular 
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of viewing 
symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe.”117  Indeed, the 
endorsement test does not involve the “the actual perception of individual 
observers,”118 because under such an approach “a religious display is 
 115.  Id. at 780. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 779. 
 118.  Id. 
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necessarily precluded so long as some passersby would perceive a 
governmental endorsement thereof.”119 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis is surprising for a number of reasons.  First, 
it is false to say that taking account of the actual reactions of individuals 
would necessitate invalidating a practice merely because some passersby 
found it offensive.  Suppose, for example, that one thousand individuals of a 
particular faith are surveyed and that two found a particular practice an 
endorsement of religion.  All else being equal, it would be quite 
understandable for Justice O’Connor to suggest that the relevant test does 
not invalidate the practice.  There may well be an explanation for these 
reactions that does not provide a basis for Establishment Clause concern; for 
example, that the survey responses were insincere or involved some 
misunderstanding.  But refusing to find that the endorsement test invalidates 
a practice under those circumstances does not justify refusing to consider 
actual reactions at all. 
Suppose that a different survey was taken and that a majority of the 
community, adherents and nonadherents alike, viewed a particular practice 
as endorsing religion.  That, one would hope, would suffice to establish the 
unconstitutionality of a practice.  Regrettably, Justice O’Connor suggests 
that even such survey results would not be dispositive, because the 
“endorsement inquiry should be conducted from the perspective of a 
hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a certain level of 
information that all citizens might not share.”120  After all, Justice O’Connor 
would have held as a matter of law that inclusion of a crèche in a holiday 
display was not unconstitutional under the endorsement test, regardless of 
the actual reactions of the community.121 
After a moment’s reflection, one comes to realize that Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test is much different from what it might initially 
have been supposed to be.  Justice O’Connor had once emphasized the 
importance of not making “religion relevant, in reality or public perception, 
to status in the political community,”122 but now suggests that religion being 
perceived to be or actually being a factor in one’s status in the political 
community does not matter as long as the hypothetical reasonable observer 
with the requisite quantum of knowledge (neither too much nor too little) 
would not infer endorsement.123 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 780. 
 121.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 122.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692. 
 123.  See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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Justice Stevens understood the endorsement test somewhat differently.  
He argued that it is especially important for the endorsement test to “take 
account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the 
particular religious belief it expresses.”124  Of course, not all informed 
nonadherents react the same way.  For example, some nonadherents did not 
believe the crèche at issue in Lynch involved an endorsement of religion,125 
whereas others did believe it an endorsement.126  Justice Stevens would not 
require unanimity among nonadherents in order to find an Establishment 
Clause violation, suggesting that if a “reasonable person could perceive a 
government endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State 
may not allow its property to be used as a forum for that display.”127  Justice 
Stevens offered an example of when endorsement might be perceived: A 
reasonable observer of “any symbol placed unattended in front of any capitol 
in the world will normally assume that the sovereign—which is not only the 
owner of that parcel of real estate but also the lawgiver for the surrounding 
territory—has sponsored and facilitated its message.”128  Because a 
reasonable person might well perceive endorsement under such 
circumstances, the state is precluded from having an unattended religious 
symbol in front of the state capitol.129 
Justice O’Connor rejected Justice Stevens’s analysis, suggesting that the 
reasonable observer about whom he was speaking was less than adequately 
informed.130  But if that is the difficulty, there are ways to rectify the 
problem.  Consider a solution proposed by Justice O’Connor to help inform 
the reasonable observer, namely, having the state post a disclaimer so that 
the state would not be associated with the message at issue.131  Such a 
 124.  Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 125.  See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.R.I. 1981) (“The Mayor noted that at 
least one segment of the Jewish community in Pawtucket has called him to express support and to 
state that they regard the inclusion of the nativity scene as ‘a thing of joy and not a religious service 
or observance of any kind.’”), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 126.  See id. at 1157 (“Steven Brown, Executive Director of the ACLU, saw the creche twice in 
December, 1980. . . .  Like Mr. Donnelly, he regarded it as a religious symbol which, by its inclusion 
within the City’s display, represented official sponsorship of a particular religious viewpoint. . . .  
Mr. Brown was raised and educated in the Jewish faith.” (footnote and citations omitted)). 
 127.  See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 128.  Id. at 801–02. 
 129.  See id. at 802, 806. 
 130.  See id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my 
view, proper application of the endorsement test requires that the reasonable observer be deemed 
more informed than the casual passerby postulated by JUSTICE STEVENS.”). 
 131.  See id. at 776. 
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disclaimer would allegedly suffice to persuade the reasonable observer that 
the message at issue should not be attributed to the state.132 
Yet, there is reason to believe that Justice O’Connor’s remedy of 
posting a disclaimer would not have persuaded Justice Stevens or even the 
reasonable observer in some circumstances of the state’s non-endorsement 
of the message at issue.  Justice Stevens would likely suggest that even a 
disclaimer would not suffice to establish non-endorsement, because “the 
Constitution generally forbids the placement of a symbol of a religious 
character in, on, or before a seat of government.”133  For example, in Van 
Orden v. Perry,134 the State of Texas had a monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments on the State Capitol grounds.135  Even if that monument had 
included an inscription containing a secular purpose—for example, to 
provide guidance to youth and “to combat juvenile delinquency”—Justice 
Stevens would have struck down the maintenance of such a monument on 
state grounds as unconstitutional.136 
Suppose, however, that one does not accept Justice Stevens’s 
presumption against placing religious symbols on state grounds, and one 
believes that the reasonable observer should decide for oneself whether a 
religious display accompanied by a disclaimer should be inferred to be an 
endorsement.  While the disclaimer might initially seem sufficient for the 
state to be able to show that it did not endorse a religious message, a 
reasonable observer might not be satisfied with that “quantum of 
knowledge.”137  Suppose, for example, that the mayor had explained to the 
faithful that the waiver was there because, otherwise, those small, selfish, 
objecting nonadherents would deprive the majority of cherished religious 
symbols.138  Presumably, a knowledgeable observer who was aware of that 
subterfuge might infer endorsement, although Justice O’Connor rejected that 
a reasonable observer would infer endorsement in Pawtucket, the mayor’s 
comments about his desire to keep Christ in Christmas notwithstanding.139 
 132.  See id. at 776 (discussing the requirement that the state sometimes include a disclaimer to 
“make the State’s role clear to the community”). 
 133.  Id. at 806–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 134.  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 135.  See id. at 681. 
 136.  See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Though the State of Texas may genuinely wish to 
combat juvenile delinquency, and may rightly want to honor the Eagles for their efforts, it cannot 
effectuate these admirable purposes through an explicitly religious medium.”). 
 137.  Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 138.  Cf. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.R.I. 1981) (“[T]he Mayor explained the 
public reaction by suggesting that people ‘thought it was very small of anybody to question what had 
been accepted by the community’ for so many years ‘as a good thing.’”), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st 
Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 139.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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Part of the appeal of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test involves its 
recognition that no members of the community should feel like second-class 
citizens because of their religious beliefs.140  Yet, Justice O’Connor seems 
much more concerned about the feelings of the hypothetical observer and 
much less concerned that some members of the community might 
reasonably and actually feel like insiders and outsiders respectively because 
of a particular display.141 
In Mitchell v. Helms,142 members of the Court continued the trend in 
which they claimed that the reasonable person could only have one view, 
lack of consensus on the Court about what a reasonable person would say 
notwithstanding.  At issue was government funding used to lend educational 
material and equipment to public and private schools.143  The difficulty 
presented for Establishment Clause purposes was that the equipment in a 
parochial school might be used to indoctrinate schoolchildren in religious 
matters.144 
The Mitchell plurality announced that a reasonable person would not 
infer government endorsement, even if the government funded materials 
were used to teach children matters of faith.145  “If the religious, irreligious, 
and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would 
conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has 
been done at the behest of the government.”146  The plurality explained: “In 
distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and 
indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of 
neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons 
without regard to their religion.”147 
 140.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way 
to a person’s standing in the political community.”). 
 141.  See Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and Endorsement of 
Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1545 (2010) (“Justice O’Connor may be accurate in 
concluding that a standard based on the perceptions of adherents and nonadherents increases the 
likelihood that government displays of religious symbols would be found to be impermissible 
endorsements of religion.  If so, the Court should be wary of such displays, not employ an objective 
observer standard that purports to value inclusion but ignores dissenting viewpoints.”). 
 142.  530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 143.  Id. at 801–02. 
 144.  See id. at 804. 
 145.  Id. at 809. 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. 
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At least two difficulties are posed by the Mitchell plurality’s analysis.  
First, it misrepresents the past jurisprudence.  In many of the previous cases, 
the Court invoked neutrality when upholding the provision of aid to both 
secular and parochial schools as long as the funds, equipment, or materials 
were not used to promote religion.148  The neutrality had been with respect to 
the identity of the provider rather than to the nature of the aid.149  For 
example, in Board of Education v. Allen,150 the Court upheld the loan of 
secular textbooks to parochial school students.151  Indeed, part of the 
supporting rationale was that the Court was confident that those approving 
of the books could distinguish between secular and sectarian texts and that 
only the former would be approved.152  If the Mitchell plurality’s analysis of 
neutrality had accurately reflected the Court’s jurisprudence, the Allen Court 
would never even have discussed the limitations on the books that would 
receive approval. 
The reason that the Court in Meek v. Pittenger153 had upheld loaning 
textbooks to parochial schools was that the books were secular, citing 
Allen.154  However, the Meek Court struck down the provision of other kinds 
of materials and equipment, reasoning that “it would simply ignore reality to 
attempt to separate secular educational functions from the predominantly 
religious role performed by many of Pennsylvania’s church-related 
elementary and secondary schools and to then characterize Act 195 as 
channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian.”155  
Because the other kinds of materials and equipment could have been used to 
promote religious indoctrination, providing them to sectarian schools would 
violate constitutional guarantees.156 
The same point might have been made about books, namely, that they 
too might be used to promote the school’s sectarian mission.  However, the 
 148.  See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (approving the dispersion of 
government funds to parents of children attending parochial schools where the spending was part of 
a “general program under which [the state paid] the fares of pupils attending public and other 
schools” because the First Amendment requires “the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups 
of religious believers and non-believers”). 
 149.  See id. 
 150.  392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968). 
 151.  Id. at 245 (“[O]nly secular books may receive approval.”). 
 152.  Id. (“[W]e cannot assume that school authorities, who constantly face the same problem in 
selecting textbooks for use in the public schools, are unable to distinguish between secular and 
religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law.”). 
 153.  421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 154.  See id. at 361–62 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 244–45) (“[T]he record in the case before us, like 
the record in Allen, . . . contains no suggestion that religious textbooks will be lent or that the books 
provided will be used for anything other than purely secular purposes.”). 
 155.  Id. at 365. 
 156.  Id. at 366. 
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Meek Court was reluctant to overrule Allen,157 and thus upheld the provision 
of books but struck down the provision of the other materials. 
The Meek Court believed that loaning equipment to sectarian schools 
might reasonably be viewed as promoting or endorsing religion.158  So, too, 
in Wolman v. Walter,159 the Court upheld various programs and services at 
parochial schools, precisely because the provision of those programs and 
services on site was not likely to result in sectarian indoctrination.160  
However, those programs that might lend themselves to sectarian 
indoctrination had to be performed off site where it was thought less likely 
that the sectarian indoctrination would occur.161 
It is debatable whether the Wolman Court was correct in its judgment 
with respect to who would be more likely to indoctrinate or whether 
indoctrination would be more likely to take place in some locations than in 
others.162  Nonetheless, it should at least be clear what the Court in Meek and 
Wolman had been trying to do and that the Mitchell plurality’s explication of 
neutrality did not accurately reflect the jurisprudence.163  As Justice Souter 
pointed out in his Mitchell dissent, the plurality’s usage of “neutrality” did 
not reflect how that term had been used in much of the previous case law.164 
In her Mitchell concurrence in the judgment, Justice O’Connor 
suggested that if a religious school uses aid directly received from the 
government to indoctrinate students, then “it is reasonable to say that the 
government has communicated a message of endorsement.  Because the 
 157.  Cf. Mark Strasser, Repudiating Everson: On Buses, Books, and Teaching Articles of Faith, 
78 MISS. L.J. 567, 601 (2009) (“In short, the Meek Court upheld the practice that had already been 
upheld in Allen, but struck down the remaining provisions, notwithstanding the Court’s professed 
confidence that the materials, equipment, and services at issue were secular and would not be put to 
sectarian uses.”). 
 158.  For the suggestion that promotion of religion and endorsement of religion are describing the 
same kind of phenomenon, see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 593 (2002) (“Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential 
principle remains the same.”). 
 159.  433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 160.  See id. at 244 (“The nature of the relationship between the diagnostician and the pupil does 
not provide the same opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views as attends the relationship 
between teacher and student or that between counselor and student.”). 
 161.  See id. at 247 (“The danger existed there, not because the public employee was likely 
deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather because the pressures of the 
environment might alter his behavior from its normal course.  So long as these types of services are 
offered at truly religiously neutral locations, the danger perceived in Meek does not arise.”). 
 162.  See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 817–18 (rejecting the reasoning of Meek and Wolman). 
 163.  See id. at 839 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he plurality’s rule does not 
accurately describe our recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 164.  See id. at 878–84 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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religious indoctrination is supported by government assistance, the 
reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government 
support for the advancement of religion.”165  Thus, in Mitchell as well, the 
different Justices could not agree about the conditions under which the 
reasonable observer would infer endorsement. 
So, too, members of the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris166 could not 
agree about the conditions under which the reasonable observer would infer 
state endorsement of religion.  Zelman involved a voucher program in 
Cleveland whereby state funds were used to pay tuition at parochial schools 
without any limitations on how those funds would be used.167  The majority 
suggested that “no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of 
private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of 
the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the 
imprimatur of government endorsement.”168 
Yet, there were numerous factors that the informed reasonable observer 
might have taken into account when making her assessment, for example, 
that the amount of the voucher was lower than what various private 
nonreligious schools charged in tuition but higher than what various 
parochial schools charged.169  That fact might lead a reasonable observer to 
infer state promotion of religion, and one obvious way to combat that 
appearance of favoritism would be to increase the value of the voucher.170  
On the other hand, the reasonable observer would also be aware that states 
face a variety of fiscal challenges and that increasing the voucher amount 
would have its own drawbacks in a period of ever-growing deficits.171 
 165.  Id. at 843 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 166.  536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 167.  See id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The money will thus pay for eligible students’ 
instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion as well, in schools that can fairly be 
characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all subjects with a 
religious dimension.”). 
 168.  Id. at 655 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398–99 (1983)). 
 169.  Id. at 704–05 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter explained: 
[T]he $2,500 cap that the program places on tuition for participating low-income pupils 
has the effect of curtailing the participation of nonreligious schools: “nonreligious 
schools with higher tuition (about $4,000) stated that they could afford to accommodate 
just a few voucher students.”  By comparison, the average tuition at participating 
Catholic schools in Cleveland in 1999–2000 was $1,592, almost $1,000 below the cap. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 170.  See id. at 706 (“[T]he obvious fix would be to increase the value of vouchers so that existing 
nonreligious private and non-Catholic religious schools would be able to enroll more voucher 
students, and to provide incentives for educators to create new such schools given that few presently 
exist.”). 
 171.  See Randle B. Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick up the Trash?—Using the Build America Bond 
Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficits, 8 PITT. TAX. REV. 171, 171 (2011) 
(“All over the United States, state and local governments are facing increasing revenue deficits due 
to the recession.”). 
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The reasonable observer of the Cleveland voucher program might also 
have taken into account that many parents were sending their children to 
schools promoting the views of other faiths, and that these parents were not 
doing so because they wanted to expose their children to the views of other 
faiths but simply because they did not believe that they had any other 
realistic choice.172  Once again, the differing possible reactions of the 
reasonable observer could not simply be attributed to their varying quanta of 
knowledge but to additional factors as well, for example, how they weighed 
the different factors when assessing what message might be inferred. 
In Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe,173 the majority again 
announced how the reasonable observer would react, despite the 
protestations to the contrary by members of the dissent.174  This time, 
however, the Court suggested that no reasonable observer would fail to infer 
endorsement.175  At issue was a school policy that permitted students to 
decide by majority vote whether there would be a solemnizing message at 
football games.  If so, then there would be a separate vote to decide who 
would give that message.176 
Members of the Court could not agree about whether a student elected 
to offer the football game message would be giving a public or a private 
address.  The majority suggested that “the members of the listening audience 
must perceive the pregame message as a public expression of the views of 
the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the school 
 172.  See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Evidence shows, however, that almost two out of three families using vouchers to send 
their children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of those schools.  The 
families made it clear they had not chosen the schools because they wished their children 
to be proselytized in a religion not their own, or in any religion, but because of 
educational opportunity. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 173.  530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 174.  See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
Here, by contrast, the potential speech at issue, if the policy had been allowed to proceed, 
would be a message or invocation selected or created by a student.  That is, if there were 
speech at issue here, it would be private speech.  The “crucial difference between 
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and 
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses 
protect,” applies with particular force to the question of endorsement. 
Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)). 
 175.  Id. at 308 (majority opinion) (“Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, the 
message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable 
pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.”). 
 176.  See id. at 306. 
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administration.”177  In contrast, the dissent suggested that the speech at issue 
would be “private speech.”178  But the reasonable observer might react quite 
differently to public as opposed to private speech involving a religious 
message, at least with respect to whether the state was itself endorsing the 
articulated view. 
One of the best cases to illustrate some of the different ways in which 
the endorsement test might be used is Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow179 in which the constitutionality of mandating the Pledge of 
Allegiance in primary schools was at issue.  The current Pledge is: “I pledge 
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic 
for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and 
justice for all,”180 and the challenge was to the inclusion of “under God” in 
particular.181 
The Court explained that the original Pledge did not include the 
challenged words,182 but “under God” was later added in 1954.183  In his 
concurrence in the judgment, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the 
individual who sponsored adding those words wanted to “contrast this 
country’s belief in God with the Soviet Union’s embrace of atheism.”184  
However, Rehnquist pointed out:  
 
To the millions of people who regularly recite the Pledge, 
and who have no access to, or concern with, such 
legislation or legislative history, “under God” might mean 
several different things: that God has guided the destiny of 
the United States, for example, or that the United States 
exists under God’s authority.185 
 
For purposes here, the relevant issue is what the reasonable observer 
would say about the decision to include the words “under God” within the 
Pledge, and the reasonable observer would be aware of the intent to 
distinguish the theistic United States from the atheistic Soviet Union.  
Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor explained that the reasonable observer “fully 
 177.  Id. at 308. 
 178.  Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 179.  542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 180.  Id. at 7 (quoting 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)). 
 181.  Id. at 5 (“Respondent, Michael A. Newdow, is an atheist whose daughter participates in that 
daily exercise.  Because the Pledge contains the words ‘under God,’ he views the School District’s 
policy as a religious indoctrination of his child that violates the First Amendment.”). 
 182.  See id. at 6. 
 183.  See id. at 7. 
 184.  See id. at 25 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 185.  Id. at 26. 
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aware of our national history and the origins of such practices, would not 
perceive these acknowledgments [including the Pledge] as signifying a 
government endorsement of any specific religion, or even of religion over 
nonreligion.”186  She argued that the Pledge “purports only to identify the 
United States as a Nation subject to divine authority,”187 although it seems 
likely that an atheist would feel like a second-class citizen in such a nation. 
Even if the Pledge was merely a state-sanctioned description of the 
nation as theistic rather than, for example, as a country where the freedom to 
believe or not believe thrives, non-believers might feel like second-class 
citizens.  Yet, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his Newdow concurrence, a 
pledge of allegiance involves more than a mere description of the Nation—it 
instead involves a personal affirmation.188  By mandating recitation of the 
Pledge, the state might be viewed as promoting or endorsing religion in two 
different respects: (1) it gets children to affirm or reaffirm a belief in God, 
and (2) it sends a message to believers that they are insiders and to non-
believers that they are outsiders. 
Newdow is helpfully compared to Doe. If Doe involved state 
endorsement because the state provided an opportunity for a student speaker 
to solemnify a football game,189 then it would seem that the state’s 
mandating recitation of the Pledge—which includes an affirmation of God’s 
existence and, perhaps, “authority”190—more than suffices to establish state 
endorsement. Indeed, one might add to the mix that the recitation of the 
Pledge is led by the state’s representative, the teacher,191 rather than by a 
student, as was true in Doe.192  So it might be somewhat surprising that 
Justice O’Connor was confident that the reasonable observer could not find 
the Pledge requirement an endorsement. 
The endorsement test as promulgated by Justice O’Connor relied on the 
perceptions of the reasonable observer.  However, she recognized “the 
 186.  Id. at 36. 
 187.  Id. at 40. 
 188.  See id. at 47 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Pledge involves 
“children actually pledging their allegiance”). 
 189.  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
 190.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 191.  See id. at 4–5 (majority opinion) (“Each day elementary school teachers in the Elk Grove 
Unified School District (School District) lead their classes in a group recitation of the Pledge of 
Allegiance.”). 
 192.  Doe, 530 U.S. at 294.  The claim here is not that student-led religious exercises during 
school hours would pass constitutional muster.  See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down student-led prayers in schools). 
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dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation”193 and was unwilling to rely 
on “a subjective approach [that] would reduce the test to an absurdity.”194  
After all, the test would simply be unable to distinguish among permissible 
and impermissible actions by the state when “[n]early any government 
action could be overturned as a violation of the Establishment Clause if a 
‘heckler’s veto’ sufficed to show that its message was one of 
endorsement.”195 
Yet, the heckler discussed by Justice O’Connor is not merely some 
individual who interferes with someone else’s exercise of First Amendment 
rights.  It might instead refer to a reasonable, knowledgeable individual who 
sincerely perceives a state practice as promoting or undermining religion.  
Further, that “heckler” might not simply be offering an idiosyncratic 
reaction, but might instead be reacting in the same way that a host of 
adherents and nonadherents react. 
Suppose that a whole group of sincere, knowledgeable nonadherents 
sincerely believes that a particular state practice makes them into second-
class citizens.  Suppose further that a whole group of sincere, knowledgeable 
adherents sincerely believes that a particular state practice (rightfully) 
privileges that group.  Justice O’Connor suggests that such a practice might 
nonetheless not involve endorsement, because a hypothetical observer with 
the correct quantum of knowledge would allegedly react differently.196  But 
this means that the endorsement test might have quite ironic results.  Not 
only would it permit the state to send a “message to [religious] nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community,”197 but it would add insult to injury by telling 
those religious nonadherents that they were not knowledgeable or 
reasonable, but were instead the equivalent of religious hecklers. 
The reasonable person might have different reactions to a particular 
state practice, and it “blinks reality”198 to claim that all knowledgeable, 
reasonable people will agree about whether a particular state practice 
promotes or undermines religion.  Rather than decide whether Establishment 
Clause guarantees are violated or instead respected when some reasonable 
observers would infer endorsement and others would not, members of the 
Court instead pretend that reasonable observers could not disagree.  Such an 
approach is especially disappointing, given the numerous cases in which 
 193.  Newdow, 542 U.S. at 34–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 194.  Id. at 35. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 35. 
 197.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 198.  Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 757 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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presumably reasonable members of the Court could not themselves agree 
about whether a particular practice constitutes state endorsement. 
III.  THE POST-O’CONNOR ENDORSEMENT TEST 
Justice O’Connor retired in 2006, and indeed, many members of the 
Court who contributed to our understanding of the endorsement test’s 
evolution are no longer on the Court.  Chief Justice Rehnquist was replaced 
by Chief Justice Roberts shortly before Justice O’Connor retired, and both 
Justice Stevens199 and Justice Souter200 have retired since then.  While no 
recent case establishes how the endorsement test will fare in the future, two 
cases are suggestive with respect to whether and how it might be used. 
A.  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,201 the Court examined a city’s 
refusal to install a permanent monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of 
Summum in a public park.  Because a public park is a traditional public 
forum, the Tenth Circuit held that the city had to accept the monument.202  
The United States Supreme Court reversed,203 explaining that “the placement 
of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of 
government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free 
Speech Clause.”204  Because the Free Speech Clause did not impose 
limitations on the power of a city to refuse a donation, the Court held that 
the city’s action did not offend constitutional guarantees.205 
While noting that the Free Speech Clause imposes no constraints on 
governmental speech,206 the Summum Court admitted that “government 
speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”207  The Court then 
 199.  Justice Stevens was replaced by Justice Kagan. 
 200.  Justice Souter was replaced by Justice Sotomayor. 
 201.  555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 202.  Id. at 464 (“The Court of Appeals held that the municipality was required to accept the 
monument because a public park is a traditional public forum.”). 
 203.  Id. at 481. 
 204.  Id. at 464. 
 205.  See id. at 481 (“[T]he City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech Clause, and the Court 
of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.”). 
 206.  Id. at 467 (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it 
does not regulate government speech.” (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 
(2005))). 
 207.  Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. 
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addressed how to interpret the message communicated by a permanent 
monument on public property.208 
As an initial matter, it might seem surprising that the Court discussed 
how to interpret the message communicated by a monument for 
Establishment Clause purposes.  After all, the city had rejected a donation 
and thus did not have to worry about what message would have been 
communicated by such a monument.209  Further, the refusal of a donation 
might be for any number of reasons including, for example, a lack of 
space210 or a judgment that the donation was not aesthetically pleasing or in 
some other way not promoting city interests.211  Because what was at issue 
was the rejection of the donation of a monument rather than the acceptance 
and installation of a monument, much of the Summum opinion seemed 
unrelated to the issue before the Court.212 
Nonetheless, the Court decided to offer a long disquisition on the 
messages sent by monuments, presumably because of the city’s prior 
acceptance of a Ten Commandments monument in that same park.  The 
Court described the difficulty in determining the message communicated by 
a monument, explaining that “it frequently is not possible to identify a single 
‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and consequently, the 
thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts and 
displays such an object may be quite different from those of either its creator 
or its donor.”213  Thus, even if a creator or donor has a religious message, 
that would not suffice to establish that the state’s message is also religious.214  
Further, the state’s message may change over time, for example, because of 
the new monuments that might be erected nearby.215  Thus, it may not be 
 208.  Id. at 469. 
 209.  Id. at 466. 
 210.  See id. at 478 (“[P]ublic parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent 
monuments.”). 
 211.  See id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[C]ities use park space to further a variety of 
recreational, historical, educational, esthetic, and other civic interests.”). 
 212.  Commentators have manifested their disapproval of the Summum Court’s reasoning.  See 
Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government 
Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1302 (2010) (“Sloppy, and ultimately incoherent, 
opinions such as the Supreme Court’s majority effort in Summum do little more than confuse First 
Amendment jurisprudence and encourage official misconduct using the government speech doctrine 
as a cloak.”). 
 213.  Summum, 555 U.S. at 476. 
 214.  See id. (“By accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property, a city 
engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived significance of that conduct may not 
coincide with the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.”). 
 215.  See id. at 477 (“The message that a government entity conveys by allowing a monument to 
remain on its property may also be altered by the subsequent addition of other monuments in the 
same vicinity.”). 
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possible to ascertain the message that a state monument is intended to 
convey. 
One possible way to clear up any confusion about an intended message 
is to have a state entity announce the message that the monument is 
supposed to communicate or, in the alternative, include a disclaimer so that 
observers do not misperceive the relevant message.  While a city could 
decide to declare its own interpretation of a monument’s message, the Court 
rejected that a city is constitutionally required to make such a declaration.216  
Of course, the Court did not need to address this issue insofar as it was 
addressing the constitutionality of the city’s refusing to accept the Seven 
Aphorisms monument, and presumably was instead rejecting the necessity 
of the city’s explaining the message communicated by the monument of the 
Ten Commandments that had been accepted. 
The difficulty posed for the city was not in fashioning some official 
message that would have shielded a Ten Commandments monument from an 
Establishment Clause challenge.  Van Orden v. Perry217 establishes that the 
government can have a permanent monument of the Ten Commandments in 
a park without offending constitutional guarantees.218  The particular 
difficulty posed in Summum involved the city’s having accepted a Ten 
Commandments monument and having rejected a Summum monument of 
similar size,219 which might at least seem to send a message of endorsement 
of one religion over another.220  The city’s communication of that message 
would violate Establishment Clause guarantees.221 
 216.  Id. at 473 (rejecting the proposal that “a government entity accepting a privately donated 
monument . . . go through a formal process of adopting a resolution publicly embracing ‘the 
message’ that the monument conveys”). 
 217.  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 218.  See id. at 692 (“We cannot say that Texas’ display of this monument violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
 219.  See Summum, 555 U.S. at 465 (“Summum’s president wrote a letter to the City’s mayor 
requesting permission to erect a ‘stone monument,’ which would contain ‘the Seven Aphorisms of 
SUMMUM’ and be similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument.”). 
 220.  But see id. at 482–83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that Van Orden is dispositive with 
respect to the constitutionality of the Ten Commandments display in Pleasant Grove).  See also 
Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 97 
(2009) (“Justice Scalia concluded that the decision in Van Orden would preclude any finding that 
Pleasant Grove had violated the Establishment Clause.”). 
 221.  See Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The Supreme Court Finds a Public 
Display of the Ten Commandments to Be Permissible Government Speech, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 271, 282 (“An argument could be made that the Establishment Clause forbids any 
governmental preference for one religious sect over another, and that such favoritism was evident in 
Pleasant Grove’s refusal to display the Seven Aphorisms while continuing to display the Ten 
Commandments.”). 
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While the installation and maintenance of permanent monuments by a 
city does send a message, the Summum Court made clear the possible 
difficulty in capturing the content of the message sent.222  But this suggests 
that a variety of messages might reasonably be inferred to be sent by a 
public monument, which elevates the importance of determining whether the 
endorsement test invalidates a state practice if it might reasonably be 
inferred to be endorsing religion or, instead, does not invalidate a practice as 
long as the practice might reasonably be inferred not to be promoting or 
undermining religion.  Regrettably, the most recent decision in which the 
endorsement test played a role did not make clear which, if either, of these 
understandings of the endorsement test is accurate. 
B.  Salazar v. Buono 
At issue in Salazar v. Buono223 was the constitutionality of Congress’s 
decision to transfer ownership to a private party of a particular tract of land 
and the cross that had been built on it.224  However, an understanding of 
Salazar requires a little background. 
A cross was erected on federal land to honor soldiers who died in World 
War I serving their country.225  The cross had been a gathering point for 
Easter services since it was built.226  Frank Buono challenged the continued 
maintenance of the cross as a violation of Establishment Clause 
guarantees.227  The district court ruled in Buono’s favor.228  That decision 
was appealed.229 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling, finding that “a 
reasonable observer would perceive a cross on federal land as governmental 
endorsement of religion.”230  However, by the time that the Ninth Circuit had 
reached that conclusion, Congress had already passed a land-transfer statute 
that would transfer the land to a private party in exchange for other land.231  
 222.  See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473–76 (explaining that some observers might interpret a message 
one way while other observers might interpret the message differently). 
 223.  130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 224.  Id. at 1811 (“The Court is asked to consider a challenge, not to the first placement of the 
cross or its continued presence on federal land, but to a statute that would transfer the cross and the 
land on which it stands to a private party.”). 
 225.  See id. 
 226.  See id. at 1812. 
 227.  See id. 
 228.  See id. 
 229.  See id. 
 230.  Id. at 1813 (citing Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 549–50 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 231.  See id. 
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The Ninth Circuit did not address the constitutionality of the land-transfer 
statute.232 
After the Ninth Circuit had issued its decision that the cross on federal 
lands violated constitutional guarantees, the plaintiff returned to district 
court to prevent the land transfer.233  The district court concluded that “the 
transfer was an attempt by the Government to keep the cross atop Sunrise 
Rock and so was invalid,”234 which was affirmed on appeal by the Ninth 
Circuit.235  The Ninth Circuit decision was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.236 
The case at hand involved a “delicate problem.”237  The plurality pointed 
out that on the one hand the cross could not be maintained on federal land 
without violating the injunction issued by the district court and, on the other, 
the Government “could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect 
for those the cross was seen as honoring.”238 
Of course, many cases involve “delicate” matters, and it would be 
unsurprising for individuals to care deeply about memorials for former 
family members or for individuals who died serving their country.  But 
regrettable negative reactions notwithstanding, the Court must not refrain 
from enforcing Establishment Clause guarantees. 
One of the questions at hand was whether Establishment Clause 
guarantees had been violated.  The district court had held that a reasonable 
person would infer endorsement,239 and the Ninth Circuit had agreed.240  The 
plurality noted that the Government had not appealed the decision, making 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision final,241 although the plurality implied that it 
would have reached a different result.  For example, the plurality announced: 
“Placement of the cross on Government-owned land was not an attempt to 
set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed.  Rather, those who 
erected the cross intended simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”242  
Thus, one infers the plurality would have upheld the placement of the cross 
 232.  See id. 
 233.  See id. 
 234.  See id. at 1814 (citing Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). 
 235.  See id. (citing Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 236.  See id. 
 237.  See id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 238.  Id. at 1817 (plurality opinion). 
 239.  See id. at 1812. 
 240.  See id. at 1813. 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  Id. at 1816–17. 
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on federal land under the first prong of Lemon.243  With respect to the effect 
prong, the plurality noted that the “goal of avoiding governmental 
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the 
public realm.”244  Here, the plurality may have been suggesting that the cross 
neither would have had a prohibited effect nor would have been inferred to 
involve government endorsement.  Or, perhaps, the plurality was implying 
that the installation and maintenance of the cross passed the Lemon test and 
that the endorsement test should not have been used. 
That said, given the posture of the case, the plurality did not need to 
address whether the maintenance of the cross on federal land violated 
constitutional guarantees.245  That issue was settled.  Instead, the issue before 
the Court was whether the land-transfer act was constitutional.246  With 
respect to that issue, the plurality did not imply that the Lemon test should 
have been used.  On the contrary, the plurality chided the district court for 
analyzing the land-transfer in light of “its suspicion of an illicit 
governmental purpose”247 instead of using the endorsement test.248 
These mixed signals about which test to use were themselves 
unfortunate.  A further difficulty involved the plurality’s implicit 
understanding of the factors that would be taken into account by the 
objective observer.  The plurality seemed unconcerned that all of the factors 
that might lead a court to infer illicit purpose would also have been 
considered by the knowledgeable, reasonable observer.  For example, the 
district court noted that the government had “reserved the right to reassert 
ownership and repossess the subject property any time the Secretary of the 
Interior makes the discretionary determination that the VFW is not 
adequately maintaining the Latin cross as a World War I memorial.”249  
Further, rather than sell the land to the highest bidder, the government had 
restricted the possible recipient to the “organization (VFW) that originally 
installed the cross and desires its continued presence in the Preserve.”250  The 
district court also noted that “the private land being exchanged for the 
federal property is owned by a couple (Mr. and Mrs. Sandoz) who has 
 243.  See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test and endorsement). 
 244.  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1818. 
 245.  See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 246.  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16. 
 247.  Id. at 1819. 
 248.  See id. (“Given the sole reliance on perception as a basis for the 2002 injunction, one would 
expect that any relief grounded on that decree would have rested on the same basis.  But the District 
Court enjoined the land transfer on an entirely different basis: its suspicion of an illicit governmental 
purpose.”). 
 249.  Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono v. 
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 
(2010). 
 250.  Id. at 1180. 
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actively sought to keep the Latin cross on Sunrise Rock.”251  After 
considering these factors, the court concluded that the “government has 
engaged in herculean efforts to preserve the Latin Cross on federal land and 
that the proposed transfer of the subject property can only be viewed as an 
attempt to keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing 
the continuing Establishment Clause violation by Defendants.”252  But a 
reasonable observer might well take these factors into account when 
deciding whether the government was endorsing one religion over others. 
Needless to say, the plurality’s understanding of these events differed 
significantly from the district court’s.  For example, the plurality noted that 
the purpose of the injunction was to “address the impression conveyed by 
the cross on federal, not private, land.”253  But, the plurality reasoned, “that 
purpose would favor—or at least not oppose—ownership of the cross by a 
private party rather than by the Government.”254  After all, no one would 
claim state endorsement merely because a private party had erected and 
maintained a cross, and the plurality expressly noted that the endorsement 
test tends not to be used with respect to displays on private property.255 
Yet, it is one thing for an individual to display a religious symbol on her 
own land, and quite another for an individual to continue to display a 
religious object on “private” land acquired from the government when the 
government retains a reversionary interest in the land such that the 
government will regain title to the land if the private owner takes down the 
religious display.  A reasonable observer who knew of all of the conditions 
of the transfer might infer government endorsement of religion, assuming 
that the observer believed the cross a religious symbol. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. at 1182.  Some commentators suggest that this restriction on who could own the land 
posed the greatest Establishment Clause difficulty.  See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the 
Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 67 (2010) (“But the bigger 
problem was that Congress decided to sell the land to the VFW without entertaining other suitors.”).  
However, it is not clear why the government’s inclusion of the reversion condition does not pose at 
least as great a difficulty, especially because this condition might be thought to undermine the 
contention that the government ever lost control of the property.  See Buono, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 
(“Such a reversionary clause defeats Defendants’ contention that the government has given up 
control over the subject property.”). 
 253.  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1819. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. (“As a general matter, courts considering Establishment Clause challenges do not inquire 
into ‘reasonable observer’ perceptions with respect to objects on private land.”). 
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Some commentators suggest that a cross simply cannot be understood as 
a secular object.256  However, the plurality explained that “a Latin cross is 
not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs.”257  In addition, it “is a 
symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble 
contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for 
this Nation and its people,”258 as if the symbol ceases to be religious when 
honoring the dead. 
Justice Alito noted in his concurring opinion that the cross is “the 
preeminent symbol of Christianity.”259  However, he believed that the “the 
original reason for the placement of the cross was to commemorate 
American war dead,”260 which allegedly would not involve endorsement.  
Justice Alito understood that not all who died fighting for this country were 
Christian and even suggested that adding other religious symbols might 
dilute the appearance of endorsement of a particular religion,261 implicitly 
acknowledging how someone might infer endorsement.  But, he reasoned, 
the plaintiff would not have been satisfied even if additional religious 
symbols had been added, because that would likely have been found to be an 
endorsement of religion over nonreligion.262  Justice Alito did not address 
whether there would be ways to memorialize those who gave up their lives 
fighting for this country in World War I without using a religious symbol.263 
This is simply amazing reasoning.  Justice Alito seems to recognize that 
the cross is a religious symbol and that inclusion of other religious symbols 
might negate some of the perception that the State was preferring one 
religion over others.264  However, because inclusion of other religious 
symbols would do nothing to undermine the perception that the state was 
preferring religion over nonreligion, that remedy would not have sufficed.  
Fair enough.  Because the Establishment Clause precludes preferring one 
religion over others and religion over nonreligion as a general matter, the 
 256.  See Lund, supra note 252, at 65 (“The cross can have no secular meanings independent of its 
religious meaning.”). 
 257.  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  See id. at 1823 (“One possible solution would have been to supplement the monument on 
Sunrise Rock so that it appropriately recognized the religious diversity of the American soldiers who 
gave their lives in the First World War.”). 
 262.  See id. (“But Congress may well have thought—not without reason—that the addition of yet 
another religious symbol would have been unlikely to satisfy the plaintiff, his attorneys, or the lower 
courts that had found the existing monument to be unconstitutional on the ground that it 
impermissibly endorsed religion.”). 
 263.  See id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I certainly agree that the Nation should 
memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I, but it cannot lawfully do so 
by continued endorsement of a starkly sectarian message.”). 
 264.  Id. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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State will not escape the Clause’s strictures by favoring several religions.  
But this suggests that maintaining the cross without other symbols of course 
violates Establishment Clause guarantees rather than that maintaining the 
cross alone would be permissible. 
Not only did Justice Alito suggest that the land transfer did not offend 
endorsement guarantees, but he suggested in addition that the failure to 
maintain the cross would be inferred to undermine religion.265  He noted that 
the “demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, monument would also 
have been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that 
is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating 
from all public places and symbols any trace of our country’s religious 
heritage.”266  Presumably, Justice Alito is not merely making this point to 
suggest that some would react negatively, but is further suggesting that this 
would be a reasonable response and thus that the government’s ordering the 
destruction of this “nonreligious” symbol honoring the dead267 would itself 
fail the endorsement test.  But this use of the endorsement test would seem 
to indicate that Establishment Clause guarantees would be violated no matter 
what the government did—retaining the cross would be viewed by some 
reasonable observers as endorsing Christianity and taking down the symbol 
would be viewed by some as hostility to Christianity in particular or, 
perhaps, religion more generally.268 
The claim here is not that Justice Alito is adding a new twist to 
endorsement jurisprudence by discussing how particular state actions might 
be viewed as hostile to religion.  For example, in Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School,269 the Court held that a school could not prevent a Christian 
club from meeting after school at the same time that other school clubs met.  
The school had denied the club permission to use school grounds because 
the school viewed the activities of the club as “the equivalent of religious 
worship.”270  The Good News Club Court rejected that children would 
perceive the school’s permitting the club to meet after school as 
endorsement.271  In addition, the Court noted that even if it “were to inquire 
into the minds of schoolchildren in this case, we cannot say the danger that 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 268.  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1822–23 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 269.  533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 270.  Id. at 103. 
 271.  See id. at 118. 
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children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater than 
the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious 
viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum.”272 
Here, the Court is suggesting that an observer would be incorrect in 
perceiving the state’s permitting prayer in clubs after school as 
endorsement.273  But the Court is also suggesting that an observer might 
correctly perceive the failure to permit such a club as hostility to religion.274  
Basically, the Good News Club Court implied that the failure to permit the 
after-school student club that engaged in religious worship would violate 
Establishment Clause guarantees, just as Justice Alito implied that taking 
down the cross would violate Establishment Clause guarantees.275 
If taking down the cross would violate Establishment Clause guarantees 
and permitting the cross to remain on federal lands would violate the district 
court’s order, then Congress’s compromise might seem ideal and, in fact, 
Justice Alito praised the decision reached by Congress: “Congress chose an 
alternative approach that was designed to eliminate any perception of 
religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally 
owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism 
associated with the destruction of the historic monument.”276  Yet, Justice 
Alito did not address some of the implications of his opinion.  Consider the 
observer who characterizes the Government as hostile to religion because it 
is “bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our 
country’s religious heritage.”277  Such an observer might also be offended by 
Congress’s transferring ownership of the land on which the cross was 
located so that all traces of religious heritage on public lands could be 
eliminated.  But this suggests that the land transfer violates Establishment 
Clause guarantees by manifesting hostility toward religion. 
The crucial question for endorsement purposes involves the reaction of 
“the hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of the 
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its 
placement.”278  Consider the reasonable, informed observer who knows that 
Congress assured that the individual acquiring ownership of the land was in 
favor of keeping the cross and that the land would revert to the government 
 272.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 273.  See id. (noting the possibility that someone would “misperceive the endorsement of 
religion”). 
 274.  See id. (noting the possibility that someone would perceive rather than misperceive the 
refusal to permit the club as hostility). 
 275.  See id. 
 276.  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 1819–20 (plurality opinion). 
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were the cross taken down.  As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent, such 
an observer might well find that the state is bending over backwards to 
assure the continued display of a paradigmatic religious symbol.279  One 
infers from Justice Alito’s comments that a different reasonable observer 
might view Congress’s transferring ownership of the land as manifesting 
hostility to the public acknowledgment of religious heritage.  Still another 
reasonable observer might adopt Justice Alito’s view that the “transfer 
represents an effort by Congress to address a unique situation and to find a 
solution that best accommodates conflicting concerns.”280 
Salazar suggests that some reasonable observers might view the land 
transfer as endorsement while others would not.  Other observers would 
view dismantling the cross as hostility towards religion, while still other 
observers might view Congress’s compromise whereby ownership was 
transferred as itself involving hostility to religion.  The use of the 
endorsement test in Salazar reflects the way that the endorsement test was 
used while Justice O’Connor was on the Court—presumably reasonable 
people reach opposite conclusions about which state actions violate 
constitutional guarantees.281 
C.  What Do Summum and Salazar Suggest About the Future of the 
Endorsement Test? 
Summum suggests that it may be difficult in particular cases to identify 
the message conveyed by a particular display.  That point, while true, is 
neither particularly surprising nor significant in itself.282  For purposes here, 
the question is how this observation will fit into the endorsement test 
jurisprudence. 
Some commentators claim that the endorsement test will only invalidate 
a practice if a reasonable observer would necessarily infer endorsement.283  
 279.  See id. at 1833 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he transfer continues the existing government 
endorsement of the cross because the purpose of the transfer is to preserve its display. Congress’ 
intent to preserve the display of the cross maintains the Government’s endorsement of the cross.”). 
 280.  Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 281.  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620 
(1989) (applying Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test and noting that whether an effect is 
constitutional “must also be judged according to the standard of a ‘reasonable observer’”). 
 282.  See Gey, supra note 212, at 1301 (“This discussion was apparently intended to demonstrate 
the obvious propositions that monuments may convey different messages to different people, and 
that these messages may change with time.  All of this is true, and entirely beside the point.”). 
 283.  See Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next 
Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280, 286 (2010) (“The endorsement test, on 
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But that cannot be, because it will almost always be possible for a 
reasonable observer to claim no endorsement. 
Many of the cases involving endorsement involved dissenting opinions.  
Sometimes, some members of the Court rejected the majority view that there 
was endorsement, whereas at other times some members of the Court 
rejected the dissenting view that there was endorsement.  But if the test only 
invalidates a practice when no reasonable person would deny endorsement, 
then these cases should have been unanimous, at least with respect to 
endorsement.  Assuming that members of the Court believe each other 
sincere, knowledgeable, and reasonable, they should admit that not all 
reasonable, knowledgeable observers would find the practice an 
endorsement (because some on the Court did not), and thus that the 
endorsement test had not been met.  If, however, the endorsement test 
invalidates a practice as long as a reasonable person might have inferred 
state endorsement of religion, then many of the opinions should have been 
unanimous, at least with respect to whether the endorsement test required 
invalidation, because a reasonable person would have inferred endorsement. 
Admittedly, unanimity with respect to the implications of the 
endorsement test would not assure unanimity in result.  For example, a 
Justice might suggest that the endorsement test would require invalidation of 
a particular state practice but that the practice at issue was nonetheless 
permissible because the endorsement test was not the applicable test.284 
Someone reading the Summum opinion might have inferred that Justice 
Alito was laying the groundwork for a modified endorsement test.  In 
Summum, he suggests that there are many reasonable interpretations of 
government messages.285  Assuming that the individuals offering these 
reasonable interpretations are sincere and knowledgeable, then the 
recognition that there might be multiple reasonable reactions to a display 
might have important implications.  For example, it might mean, following 
Justice Stevens, that as long as a reasonable nonadherent believes a display 
the other hand, requires a judge to discern a single, identifiable message of exclusion conveyed by a 
monument to the reasonable observer.”); Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between 
Endorsement and History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 51–52 (2010) (“Any assertion that the 
endorsement test is not dead yet must confront the claim that it was effectively killed off in Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum.  The basis for this claim is a meandering passage in Summum in which 
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, seemed to suggest in dicta that any monument could mean 
anything to anyone.”). 
 284.  For example, Justice Thomas has suggested that certain practices are constitutional, past 
precedent notwithstanding, because the precedent was incorrect.  See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I conclude that, as a matter of 
our precedent, the Pledge policy is unconstitutional.  I believe, however, that Lee was wrongly 
decided.”). 
 285.  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/132:49 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1273, 2013] The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1313 
to be endorsing religion, the state cannot maintain that display.286  That said, 
Justice Alito may have had a different position in mind, since his discussion 
of the multiple reasonable interpretations of a state display might be a 
prelude to the position that as long as a reasonable informed individual 
would not infer endorsement, the endorsement test will not invalidate the 
display.287 
Salazar offers somewhat mixed messages regarding the endorsement 
test.  Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts implied that the land 
transfer at issue should not have been inferred to be an endorsement,288 
although the case was remanded for reconsideration.289  Justice Alito would 
not have even remanded the case and would instead have simply upheld the 
transfer.290 
It is simply unclear whether Justice Alito believed that the transfer 
passed muster because a reasonable observer might have believed this did 
not involve endorsement (even though a different observer would have 
inferred endorsement) or because no reasonable observer would have 
inferred endorsement (even though there were members of the Court with a 
different view).  The former would involve a new, very forgiving 
endorsement test, which would not invalidate a state action as long as a 
reasonable observer would not view it as involving an endorsement.  The 
latter would be the same endorsement test that has been used in the past, 
where some members of the Court implicitly suggest that their colleagues 
are not reasonable, knowledgeable, or, perhaps, sincere.  Neither 
understanding of endorsement seems likely to prevent nonadherents from 
feeling like outsiders in their political communities. 
 286.  See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text. 
 287.  In a much different context, Justice Alito suggested that state action would not violate 
constitutional guarantees as long as a reasonable person might have made a particular inference.  See 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court 
on the understanding that (1) it goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech 
that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use . . . .”). 
 288.  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–20 (2010) (“[I]t is not clear that Buono’s claim is 
meritorious.  That test requires the hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of 
the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement.”); see also id. at 
1819 (“The injunction was issued to address the impression conveyed by the cross on federal, not 
private, land.  Even if its purpose were characterized more generally as avoiding the perception of 
governmental endorsement, that purpose would favor—or at least not oppose—ownership of the 
cross by a private party rather than by the Government.”). 
 289.  See id. at 1821. 
 290.  See id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Commentators have suggested that the endorsement test may have 
retired along with Justice O’Connor.291  That suggestion does not seem 
plausible if only because members of the Court continue to invoke the test.292 
It is fair to suggest that the test may undergo revision, although that 
requires an analysis both of what it was and what it has become.  While 
Justice O’Connor initially trumpeted the importance of not making religious 
minorities feel like outsiders and second-class citizens, both her explication 
and her application of the test would sometimes permit exactly what she 
claimed the test was designed to prohibit.293  Indeed, the test might not only 
permit individuals to feel like outsiders because they might reasonably 
perceive state endorsement of religious practices contrary to their faith, but it 
might aggravate those feelings because the nonadherents were implicitly 
being branded as lacking knowledge or, perhaps, as being insincere hecklers 
when they voiced their own sincere perceptions. 
Even while Justice O’Connor was on the Court, the reasonable person’s 
view was offered to establish that a particular practice did or did not involve 
endorsement, even though presumed reasonable, knowledgeable members of 
the Court would have inferred that the reasonable observer would have 
reached a contrary result.  That same tendency has been reflected more 
recently even after Justice O’Connor’s retirement. 
It seems likely that the post-O’Connor Court will continue to use the 
endorsement test, perhaps explicitly suggesting that the test will invalidate a 
practice only if no reasonable person could fail to infer endorsement or 
perhaps suggesting that no reasonable person would infer endorsement, even 
in the face of claims to the contrary by members of the Court.  The test that 
once seemed to have great promise, because it tried to prevent nonadherents 
from feeling like second-class citizens, has all too often been used, not only 
to validate practices that are reasonably viewed as endorsing religion over 
nonreligion or one religion over others, but also to undermine the validity of 
the perceptions of those who perceive endorsement.  But that is nothing new.  
The endorsement test, a cause for celebration because of its recognition that 
this country stands for religious liberty, continues to be a source of sorrow.  
It claims to be concerned about religious endorsement while refusing to 
acknowledge the manifold ways in which certain religions are privileged 
 291.  Some have suggested that the endorsement test should not be used when analyzing whether 
government speech violates Establishment Clause guarantees.  See Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing 
Facially Religious Government Speech: Summum’s Impact on the Free Speech and Establishment 
Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315, 392–96 (2010) (“[T]he endorsement test does not apply to 
government speech . . . .”). 
 292.  See, e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 293.  See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/132:49 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1273, 2013] The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1315 
over others,294 or in which religion is preferred over nonreligion.  To pretend 
that nonadherents cannot reasonably perceive endorsement and feel like 
outsiders when confronting certain (allegedly constitutional) state practices 
is only adding insult to injury, a result countenanced under the endorsement 
test both while Justice O’Connor was on the Court and since her retirement. 
 
 294.  See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1575 (2010) (“[U]nless all citizens of a country are Jewish or Christian, a 
government invocation of God is sectarian.”). 
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